Hughes, Barry O. (2022) Defining and assessing sentience. Animal Sentience
31(13)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1744

Date of submission: 2022-07-01
Date of acceptance: 2022-07-04

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2022.433: Hughes on Rowan et al. on Sentience Politics

Defining and assessing sentience
Commentary on Rowan et al. on Sentience Politics

Barry Hughes
Formerly, Roslin Institute, University of Edinburgh
Abstract: Precisely what is meant by the term sentience and how does it overlap with being
conscious? We accept that animals have feelings but how do we know what they are and can
we measure them? It is important that we clarify the terminology underlying these difficult
concepts. Over the last 50 years a scientific discipline has developed to tackle these questions
in a systematic way. We have to avoid thoughtless anthropomorphism yet we have to try to
relate sentience in animals, as appropriate, to corresponding experiences in humans.
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1. What should we understand by the term “Sentience”
The subject we are grappling with here is a complex but fascinating one which is at the
interface where philosophy and science collide. The philosophical aspect of sentience
concerns understanding, while the scientific aspect concerns measurement. And both are
necessary. Rowan et al’s (2022) excellent target article covers both at a historical level – as
well as how our advances in knowledge should be implemented in practice and incorporated
into legislation. It is important, however, that we pay careful attention to terminology.
Moreover, the subject is internationally relevant, so when terms are translated into languages
other than English, it is vital that the meaning be understood and retained. The word
sentience is derived from the Latin verb sentire, meaning to feel, but it has many elements
and has been understood to mean very different things by different writers.
2. Five Freedoms
The only major omission I noted in Rowan et al’s target article was a mention of the
relationship between sentience, welfare and the Five Freedoms. Until the 1960s there was
little public concern regarding the increasingly intensive housing of farm animals – mainly
cage-housed hens and penned veal calves. Ruth Harrison triggered public attention in 1964
with the ground-breaking publication of Animal Machines, arguing that animals had feelings;
but farmers resisted on the grounds that there was no evidence that confinement was in any
way cruel.
In response the UK Government set up the Brambell Committee (1965) to judge whether any
action was necessary. They sought opinions, viewed intensively-housed animals, concluded
that Harrison was right and in 1965 formulated Five Freedoms. They recommended that
farmers should ensure the freedom of confined animals to stand up, lie down, turn around,
groom themselves and stretch their limbs. This was a pioneering response to the recognition
that intensively-housed animals are sentient and have needs which were not being met in

1

Animal Sentience 2022.433: Hughes on Rowan et al. on Sentience Politics

their confined environment. The Committee also recommended that ethological research
should be funded to provide firm scientific evidence for future policy.
In 1979 the Farm Animal Welfare Council re-formulated the Brambell recommendations as
(1) freedom from hunger and thirst, (2) freedom from fear and distress, (3) freedom from
discomfort, (4) freedom from pain, injury and disease and (5) freedom to exercise most
normal expressions of behaviour. The first four have been criticised as being overly focussed
on avoiding negative attributes rather than identifying positive ones, but they have
nevertheless been very influential in helping to draw up codes of welfare that have now been
adopted on a Europe-wide basis. For a full discussion of their value and limitations see
McCulloch (2012).
3. Categorising and clarifying sentience
The confusion between the terms used by different people is addressed and admirably
clarified by the commentary of Webster (2022). In its broadest sense sentience can be
regarded as relatively straightforward: it is the ability of an organism to make an appropriate
response to a stimulus. In this sense, as Reber et al (2022) write in their commentary, it is a
trait possessed by all organisms – down to the level of single cells. Given this meaning,
sentience is even possessed by plants, which are sensitive to stimuli in the ways they respond
and adapt to their environment. However, this definition is so broad that it is not especially
useful when applied to animal welfare. Here, the approach proposed by Webster is an
admirable one: the classification of sentience as a hierarchy similar to Buddhist skandhas –
from simple reactiveness right up to subjective self-awareness. It is essential, though, to have
a clear definition of what should be understood by each term. I agree with Webster that it is
important to assign a position in this classification to each animal species and then to treat it
accordingly, so that its welfare is not compromised. A parallel route, though more ambitious,
has been explored by Birch et al (2020) who suggest that a linear scale is inadequate and that
each species should be assigned a multi-dimensional profile. [See target article by Crump et
al. (2022) and accompanying commentaries -- Ed]
4. Assessing sentience
To understand what an animal is feeling and then to be able to assign it a position in a
hierarchy, one needs to do more than merely observe its behaviour and draw inferences. Just
as one would ask human beings how they feel, one needs to ask nonhuman animals. Setting
them preference tests has proved invaluable in this and has begun to give us access to their
minds. Extensive experimentation, based initially on simple choice tests (Hughes and Black,
1973), suggests that, in addition to protection from aversive stimuli which are likely to cause
suffering, all species of farm animals should be provided with a sufficiently rich environment
to allow them to express a range of their natural behaviours.
More recently, this approach has become more developed, sophisticated and quantitative so
that it can measure the strength as well as the direction of motivation. The technique is now
also being applied to lower vertebrates and to some invertebrates, and has proved
enlightening. For example, many people considered it sufficient to merely avoid inflicting pain
on a fish. However, motivation experiments have shown this to be overly simplistic. Cichlids
will work (pushing a weighted door) to gain access to food, social partners or increased space
(Galhardo et al, 2011). Likewise, goldfish will swim against a current to gain access to real
plants, artificial plants or extra space (Sullivan et al, 2015). Both approaches are quantitative
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in that the weight of the door or the strength of the current can be varied, allowing motivation
to be calibrated.
5. Consciousness
At the top of the sentience hierarchy we have consciousness, around which discussion has
ranged for centuries with little advance in understanding until recently. As a term it suffers
from the same terminological inexactitude as sentience. The Wikipedia entry puts it well.
“Consciousness remains puzzling and controversial, being at once the most familiar and also
the most mysterious aspect of our lives. Perhaps the only widely agreed notion about the
topic is the intuition that consciousness exists.” For some, it means the subjective awareness
of internal and external existence, a personal brain-based model of reality. This is my
preferred definition, and I suspect (though of course I cannot know) that it is unique to
humans. For others, it is a synonym for sentience. For example, some researchers in AI
(Ananthaswamy and Douglas, 2021) are starting to wonder whether their robots could ever
be “conscious” because they can be programmed to respond to stimuli like humans. It is
especially important for both clarity and effectiveness of discussion that all the various terms
be clearly defined and then used in a consistent way.

References
Ananthaswamy, A. and Douglas, K. (2021) Can a robot ever be conscious and how would we
know if it were? New Scientist July 7 2021
Brambell, F. W. R. (1965). Report of the technical committee to enquire into the welfare of
animals kept under intensive livestock husbandry systems. (Command Rep. 2836).
London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
Birch, J., Schnell A. K. and Clayton N. S. (2020) Dimensions of Animal Consciousness. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 24 789-801
Crump, A.; Browning, H.; Schnell, A.; Burn, C.; and Birch, J. (2022) Sentience in decapod
crustaceans: A general framework and review of the evidence. Animal
Sentience 32(1)
Galhardo, L. Almeida, O. and Oliveira, R. F. Measuring motivation in a cichlid fish : An
adaptation of the push door paradigm. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 130 60-70
Hughes, B. O. and Black, A. J. (1973) The preference of domestic hens for different types of
battery cage floor. British Poultry Science 14 615-619
McCulloch, S. P. (2012) A critique of FAWC’s Five Freedoms as a framework for the analysis
of animal Welfare. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26
Reber, A. S., Baluska, F. and Miller, William B, Jr. (2022) All living organisms are sentient.
Animal Sentience 31(3)
Rowan, A. N., D’Silva, J., Duncan, I. J. H. and Palmer, N. (2022) Animal Sentience: history,
science and politics. Animal Sentience 2022, 401
Sullivan, M., Lawrence, C. and Blache, D. (2015). Why did the fish cross the tank? Objectively
measuring the value of enrichment for captive fish Applied Animal Behaviour
Science 2015 174 181-188
Webster, J. A. (2022) Sentience and sentient minds. Animal Sentience 31(6)
3

